


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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John A. McCone, Chairman, AIC

FROM : [redacted]

SUBJECT : Impressions of Soviet Attitudes on Nuclear Exchanges

1. In response to your request, I am noting here my main impressions of the attitudes of Yemelianov and the Soviets we met in the USSR toward cooperation with the US.

2. The Soviets had evidently applied the general principle -- which we, of course, also employ -- of limiting access and discourse to previously cleared areas of information, although the only occasions when these limits were obviously and crudely encountered were at the mines, processing mill, and to some degree<sup>by</sup> our colleagues at the power stations. The point at which the Soviet practice differed from our own general procedure was in applying the further principle of giving us only the minimum necessary even within the cleared fields. Here the picture was uneven. Yemelianov himself had, of course, taken the initiative in arranging to open up the uranium mill to foreigners (and Americans, at that) and in allowing for the first time photography in certain laboratories at several places visited. Moreover, he clearly wanted you to consider the visit worthwhile, probably not only to ensure good opportunities for his return visit. More striking, most of the scientists at the institutes visited seemed quite ready and even eager to discuss most aspects of their work within the cleared areas, without unduly holding back. Indeed, I had the impression several times that Yemelianov had hurried to answer some questions so that he would prevent some of the scientists from perhaps saying more than was necessary; for example, when the subject of the manufacture of fuel elements came up at the Institute for Atomic Energy. Administrative, engineering and staff people on the other hand were much less likely than the scientists to ignore this "second principle." In short, while at least some of the scientists did not seem inhibited from genuinely free and extensive discussion of their work, over-all the general Soviet attitude was to disclose only what was necessary within the areas where any disclosure was permitted.

3. It is probably safe to generalize that by and large the men of science are inclined in favor of increasing exchanges of information.

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I believe that Yemelianov is too, with the above discussed qualification. But there are undoubtedly elements in the USSR which are not. Yemelianov told me, in a private conversation following the toasting joust at the mining village, "Don't think that it was easy to bring you all down here and open up a uranium mine and mill to you. Don't you realize there are people that opposed it? We also [sic] have those who are opposed to these [cultural and scientific] exchanges." Even granting that Yemelianov wants to encourage us to sympathize with him and not to press for additional information beyond what he offers, it is probably also true that he is subjected to such pressure.

4. Your proclaimed policy of insisting upon parity of information as a foundation for broadened cooperation and collaboration seems to me to be eminently sound, both for its intrinsic merit and because I believe that insistence on a quid pro quo is the only way we will get the Soviets to go very far beyond the easy initial barriers, which are superficially impressive (to the publics), and to get into really useful information. The data on the uranium mine and especially the mill has proved extremely useful; further information along the lines of questions not answered there, but possibly to be answered by Yemelianov now, would be most significant. This, of course, is merely an illustration and deals only with the aspect of information on their program.

5. Yemelianov did mention to me, and I suppose had mentioned to you, his tentative plans at some future time to organize a second visit for you or your representatives, this time to take in [redacted]

possibly mines and mill there?). If he does not raise the matter of such a visit on the present trip, I assume it will be due to a wish to concentrate on exchanges of individual scientists for extended tours, and to continue pressing for a joint collaborative effort of some -- almost any -- kind.

6. The forthcoming visit here should provide clearer indications of the precise Soviet objectives in exchanges in the nuclear field, and would thus help to establish the things for which they will make compensating concessions. Yemelianov, having attempted unsuccessfully in the USSR to get you to commit the US to certain future exchange and collaborative courses of action, doubtless understands this very well. As when he accompanied Khrushchev, he has probably been delegated substantial authority to undertake various commitments and courses as necessary and appropriate to further the Soviet objectives (both concrete and broadly political). We shall soon see.

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Remarks:

Bob:

I am advised that there is some urgency in getting the attached to Mr. McCone. After you have seen it, I will show it to the Director and pass it along.



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